We study the factors that, arguably, affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between structured finance (SF), either project finance (PF) loans or asset securitization (AS) bonds, and straight debt finance (SDF) -corporate bonds (CB) -transactions using a large cross section of 24,435 Western European loans and bonds issued between January 1 st , 2000 and December 31 st , 2011. Borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing and when they operate in a country with lower sovereign rating. Findings suggest that industrials, utilities, transportation, and governmental borrowers exhibit a higher likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically, a PF transaction. Several macroeconomic factors, like market interest rate levels and volatility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve, positively influence the probability of observing an SF over an SDF transaction. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis decrease the probability of observing an AS transaction. During the crisis, macroeconomic factors seem to significantly influence the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. We also find that credit spreads and loan to value ratios have a significant negative relationship for AS bonds. Overall, findings are in line with security design literature. SF transactions or instruments, based on extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with asymmetric information and agency conflicts.
Introduction
Structured finance (SF) transactions, either in the form of project finance or asset securitization structures, are financial transactions designed to meet, as closely as possible, the different requirements and needs of borrowers and investors. This paper aims to enlighten some of the main determinants of issuers selecting SF versus straight debt finance (SDF) transactions. Despite the important insightful predictions provided by security design models, firms' financing structure decisions still remain unsatisfactorily explained, mainly (i) in terms of SF transactions, and (ii) with respect to the motivation for the firms to decide resorting to SF as opposed to straight debt. One possible explanation is that extant security design theories do not simultaneously and dynamically endogenize all contractual features.
Finally, the suggested link between SF and the turmoil of the financial markets makes the analysis of the determinants of choosing an SF transaction versus an SDF transaction particularly interesting and relevant at both the theoretical and practical levels.
In an economy à la Modigliani and Miller's (1958) , 1 SF transactions would not matter. However, as argued in Miller (1988) 
"showing what doesn't matter can also show, by implication, what does"
(emphasis in the original). Therefore, and recognizing that firms' debt and equity are, de facto, assetbacked securities, M&M's irrelevance theorem can play a fundamental role within an SF framework. In a world of perfectly competitive, liquid and frictionless financial markets, where market participants have homogeneous expectations, tranching, 2 or the act of encapsulating an initiative or a pool of assets in an ad hoc organization, 3 would not add value and a firm's financing structure would be irrelevant. Thus, the existence of market imperfections and frictions, including asymmetric information problems, agency conflicts, and market and contract incompleteness, can explain tranching, 'off-balance sheet financing', and the benefits of SF instruments. In this framework, structured financing may matter, because it, arguably, may create value by minimizing the net costs associated with market imperfections.
Despite the economic benefits for sponsors and investors, SF transactions may also have disadvantages, especially when used inappropriately. There is broad consensus about the non-negligible role played by SF transactions, especially asset securitizations, in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Typically, a highly asset securitization structured instrument exhibit a superior level of aggregated informational opacity, than the 1 Hereafter M&M. 2 Tranching means the creation of multiple types of securities backed by the firm's (or by the underlying asset pool, when considering securitization) assets and is considered one of the most important features that distinguishes SF instruments from traditional debt products. See, e.g., DeMarzo (2005) for further details. 3 A key feature of SF transactions, which differentiates them from other financing arrangements, is the presence of a separate vehicle company, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity (SPE), incorporated to initiate the deal, and to secure cash receipts and the resulting payments.
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individual assets included in the SPV's asset pool, thereby worsening informational asymmetries among market participants, and therefore increasing the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
A firm's rational value maximizer manager / owner should choose between SF or SDF financing, based on the cost of capital efficiency of the available financing alternatives. For example, the decision either to go with a project finance transaction or with an SDF, should be based on the trade-off between the composite cost of capital of the project finance and the sponsor's, and the sponsor's overall cost of capital after the SDF. Thus, one first question is raised concerning the choice between SF and SDF
transactions: What factors determine the managerial choice between these financing alternatives?
The fact that firms issue securities other than debt and equity, and the recurrent introduction of new and more complex securities, raises one second question: 'What are the more efficient securities a firm should optimally issue? The paper also aims answering this question focusing on the choice between SF and SDF instruments.
To empirically trying to answer these questions, we use a comprehensive sample of SF -project finance (PF) loans and asset securitization (AS) bonds -and SDF -corporate bonds (CB) Looking at the estimation of the selection equation in model [1] , our empirical findings indicate that: (i) the effect of lower tranche size increases the probability of selecting an SF transaction, rather than an SDF transaction; (ii) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing, and when they operate in a country with higher credit risk; (iii) borrowers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government areas increase the likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically a PF transaction; (iv) the probability of observing an AS bond issue increases if the borrower belongs to the financial industry; (v) the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreases the probability of observing an AS transaction; (vi) macroeconomic factors, like the level of the interest rates, market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility positively influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond; and (vii) the market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility have proven to be irrelevant in the process of making a choice between PF loans and AS bonds.
For testing the robustness of our results, we split the sample in: (i) a pre-crisis sub-sample, from impacted the choice between these two types of financing transactions. We find that credit rating is the most important pricing factor for AS bonds at issue. This fact may be a consequence of investors' extensive reliance on credit ratings because of the innate informational complexity of securitization structures. The paper also contributes to the corporate financial economics literature, by improving the understanding of what the boundaries of firms are and new insights on the industrial organization economics. The nature of the firm as a nexus of contracts is even more apparent in SF than in SDF settings. In PF and AS, a specially incorporated new firm (SPV) is created to manage all contracts and to make cash flows more readily verifiable for lenders. In such cases, it is crucial to design financial contracts with the objective of pre-committing, whenever possible, the possible behavior of the SPV management. Careful contract design prevents agency problems between SPV sponsoring firms and lenders, and establishes an effective risk management framework. Pre-committing future obligations also reduces the volatility of cash flows available for debt service.
The paper distinguishes from prior research because: (i) no full-scale empirical study of the choice between SF and SDF transactions has yet been published -we overcome this gap by simultaneously using DealScan and DCM Analytics databases; (ii) in order to test the expected impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979) ; and (iii) the sampling period covers a pre-crisis period, from January 1 The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the security design theoretical and empirical background, and the interconnections with SF literature. Section 3 describes the DealScan and DCM Analytics databases used in this study. The basic characteristics of the samples of SF versus SDF transactions are also presented here. In section 4, the organization choice models are discussed and applied. The factors that influence the choice of an SF transaction instead of an SDF transaction are presented and discussed. Section 5 summarizes the paper. 
Security Design and Structured Finance

Theoretical and Empirical Background
The literature on security design is quite extensive. Its comprehensive survey is well beyond the scope of this work. Instead, we parsimoniously review the mainstream financial structure literature highlighting the more relevant contributions to identify the economic factors that, arguably, may underlie the origination of structured finance transactions.
It is well understood that under conditions of complete, perfect and frictionless markets, and complete contracting, the firm's financing choices are irrelevant in terms of its market value, and in terms of the welfare of its security holders (M&M). 4 By implication, the specific type and features of the financing contractual arrangement are also irrelevant. Therefore, the debt or equity contracts under which investors supply funds to the firm, are optimal financial contracting arrangements.
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In real-world market economies, markets are incomplete and plagued with imperfections and frictions, and contracts are incomplete, though. 6 In this environment a firm's financing policy does matter. 7 However, theoretically it is still not well understood why actual real world firms' financing contracts, recurrently appear in certain patterns [e.g., Harris and Raviv (1989) ]. This suggests that it is needed a more robust theoretical framework to help explaining the financing decision-making of those firms, namely in terms of security design.
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The notion that a firm can be conceptualized as a nexus of contracts is a particularly powerful and helpful framework to rationalize the corporate financial structure. 9 In a nexus of contracts setting, ownership rights play a central role in analyzing contractual relationships [Grossman and Hart (1986) , Stiglitz (1989) , and Hart and Moore (1990) ]. The specification of such individual ownership rights requires contracting the allocation of both residual rights of control, and residual rents [e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1992) ]. The importance of residual control rights derives from the difficulty of writing complete 4 If a contract could be costlessly written, laying down each party's obligations and payoffs for any conceivable eventuality in every possible future state of the world, then any contracting problems would not emerge. 5 M&M irrelevance theorem was extended and generalized under less stringent assumptions, including the presence of risky debt and hybrid securities, the relaxation of the risk class assumption, and assuming intertemporal settings [see Stiglitz (1969 Stiglitz ( , 1974 , Smith (1972) , Baron (1974 Baron ( , 1976 , Merton (1974), and Hellwig (1981) ].
6 Among the problems associated with market imperfections and frictions, and contracts incompleteness are: (i) the imperfect observability of agent's actions; and (ii) the costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts. 7 As argued by Stiglitz (1989) Jensen and Meckling (1976) , and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) ] that Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) and Allen and Winton (1995) argue that it is the dominant paradigm in modern corporate finance.
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contracts. 10 Therefore, the uncertainty inherent to incomplete contracts is potentially a source for opportunistic behavior of the contracting parties [Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) ].
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Within this literature, Allen and Winton (1995) argue that the security design theoretical framework provides a promising foundation to examine the derivation of efficient financial contracts as mechanisms to optimally align the interests of the contracting parties.
The observation of real world firms' financing behavior shows that their financing patterns tend to vary cross-sectionally and over time, within apparently homogeneous industries, and even when markets, institutions, regulation and taxations seem apparently invariant. Despite the remarkable diversity of available financing alternatives, continued security design innovation still seems to be a prolific source of new tailor-made security arrangements and contractual designs for the corporate financing world.
Structured finance instruments are commonly mentioned as one group of newly introduced instruments resulting from innovation activities in security and contractual design.
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The appeal of structured finance instruments is contingent on the trade-off between the costs for the borrower in designing and structuring a new instrument, and the benefits they offer to investors or lenders. Among the sources of value creation identified in the extant structured finance literature, are included: (i) risk reallocation / yield reduction -risks are transferred from those who are less willing to bear it to those who are more willing to bear it (e.g., collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and stripped mortgage-backed securities -AS); (ii) agency costs mitigation -capital structure must be engineered to accommodate the risk-return preferences of the various classes of investors lowering potential agency costs (e.g., PF and leveraged buyouts); (iii) reduced issuance costs (e.g., AS); and (iv) tax arbitrage (e.g., structured leases) [e.g., Finnerty (1988) ].
The Economics of Structured Finance
Structured finance is related to the design of financial instruments based on the use of contracting tools and mechanisms to meet, as closely as possible, the requirements and needs of the originator or owner of an asset (or pool of assets) and investors' expected requirements. Thus, SF encompasses all financial arrangements helping to efficiently (re)finance a specified pool of assets beyond the scope of onbalance sheet financing [Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007) , Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) , and Jobst (2007) ].
10 Williamson (1990) argues that in a bounded rationality world "all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete." 11 According to Hart (1988) , Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson should be credited for the "insight that the firm as an institution takes on importance only in a world of incomplete contracts. " See Tirole (1999) , Hart and Moore (1999) , Maskin and Tirole (1999) , and Aghion and Bolton (1992), for rigorous discussions on incomplete contracts. 12 Finnerty (1988) suggests that leveraged buyout structuring, corporate restructuring, and project finance/lease/asset-based financial structuring are relevant examples of financial innovation.
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In an SF transaction, the requirements of the owner of the assets or cash flows refer to liquidity, funding, risk transfer, efficient risk allocation, favorable capital, tax and accounting treatment, or other needs. Instruments are usually designed, namely in terms of covenants, warrantees, corporate structure, contracts, and trusts, to achieve segregation of those assets or cash flows from the originator or sponsor of the transaction. Additionally, credit enhancement mechanisms are implemented (e.g., the use of warrantees to enhance recoveries and tranching to define risk attachment points). In brief, there are three main specificities of SF. First, the critical role played by the vehicle company; i.e., the recipient of the raised funds is a separate entity from the party or parties sponsoring the transaction, which plays an important role in the segmentation of cash flows and risks in a form proving more attractive for investors, through a structuring process. 13 Secondly, the high level of leverage, and finally, the centrality of prospective cash flow in order to evaluate the feasibility of the operation.
Prior research has identified the following main categories of SF transactions: (i) asset securitization; 14 (ii) project finance; 15 (iii) structured leasing; 16 and (iv) leveraged acquisitions, namely
Leveraged Buy-Outs (LBOs) 17 [Roever and Fabozzi (2003) , Caselli and Gatti (2005) Consequently, structuring such a deal is more costly than corporate financing. Moreover, it can be said that there is a broad consensus that securitization played an important role in the development and and even more complex securities, destroyed information, thereby making asymmetric information worse in the financial system and increasing the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Additionally, the originate-to-distribute business model, which lay behind the subprime mortgage market, was subject to the principal-agent problem. Several authors argue that securitization lead to a severe principal-agent problem where the firm, who originates the assets to be ultimately sold and securitized, retains little or no interest in the pool of securitized assets. In this case, the originator does not have the same incentive to pay attention to the creditworthiness of its customers, as would be the case when the assets remain on its balance sheet. This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) and Jobst (2006, 2009) , who argue that market failures stemming from conflicts of interest in the securitization process played a major role in the 2007-2008 crisis.
19 See, among others, IMF (2008) , Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), and Brunnermeier (2009) . 20 See, e.g., Caselli and Gatti (2005) , Fabozzi et al. (2006) , Gorton (2009) , and Gorton and Metrick (2013) . There is a broad agreement that in a complete contracting environment security design is irrelevant.
The Design of Structured Finance Transactions
Therefore, it is possible to design and write an ex-ante incentive contract to induce the agent to act in the principal's best interest. Harris and Raviv (1989) argue that security design is a tool for resolving conflict of interest between contestants for control and outside investors and for maximizing firm value. This sheds light on designing optimal securities, and on the development of SF instruments. Allen and Gale (1988) suggest that successful SF instruments allocate cash flows to the investors who value them the most, allowing securities to be held in their most efficient form. Summarizing, SF research should focus on market imperfections to understand the design of SF transactions.
Optimal contractual arrangements derived in the financial contracting literature are mechanisms used to resolve different types of conflicts of interest or asymmetric information problems that arise in agency relationships between economic agents, 21 such as entrepreneurs and financiers; i.e., the research on optimal contracting allows understanding in which situations securities are optimal responses to capital market imperfections [Sannikov (2013) ]. Most of the research carried out on the formal study of financial contracting has been developed along the main argument to be resolved by endogenous contract determination. From this perspective, the literature can be classified based on a relatively stable taxonomy [Allen and Winton (1995) , and Harris and Raviv (1995) ].
The first group of models -allocation of cash flow rights in agency conflicts -views financial contracts as mechanisms to efficiently align the interests of entrepreneurs with outside investors. In these models, insiders presumably have the ability to appropriate (at least partially) project's income, and have access to private benefits of control. Under these conditions, it has been shown that the debt contract is the only optimal contract when lenders cannot observe borrowers' income without costs. 22 In this class of models, 'equity' is entirely owned by the entrepreneur (insiders), and all external financing is raised under the form of debt contracts. 23 Diamond (1984) , Gale and Hellwing (1985) , Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 , and
Boyd and Smith (1994) developed a model where costly verification of project outcomes can be done stochastically. In such a case, they showed that standard debt contracts are almost optimal contracts. Lacker (1990) generalized Diamond's model and showed that, when a borrower holds an asset with a higher marginal utility for the borrower than for the lender, a debt contract collateralized by this asset 11 (e.g., home mortgages, car loans, or loans backed by a new business' assets) is optimal. 24 In Winton (1995), when the borrower can borrow from multiple investors he prefers to issue debt-like contracts with varying degrees of seniority rather than symmetric debt-like contracts -assigning different levels of seniority to different investors reduces the duplication of verification costs. Winton's model can be applied to explain some features of SF transactions. In a Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) many classes of debt and preferred stock are typically issued, and the most junior claims are held by management and a buyout fund that monitors management closely. The second application is AS, where relatively small financial claims are pooled by an intermediary and then refinanced. In securitization, two or more tranches are issued with different degrees of seniority among investors, the originating institution typically agrees to buy the tranche's 'first loss', 25 and 'credit enhancement' is often provided by a third-party who provides coverage for additional losses up to a fixed amount.
The models developed into the second set of theories are driven by adverse selection considerations -allocation of cash flow rights in adverse selection environments. At this point, securities are designed to signal borrower's private information to lenders. Among others, Allen and Gale (1992), De and Kale (1993) , and Nachman and Noe (1994) show that, with adverse selection, non-contingent securities, like standard debt, are optimal contracts. An early stream of this literature is driven by the impact of market imperfections and the economic characteristics of firms concerning their choice of debt maturity. It is mainly concerned with the effects of market frictions and imperfections, such as transaction costs, taxes, and interest rate risk on firms' debt maturity decisions. When the information about the true quality of a firm's assets is asymmetrically distributed between insiders and outsiders, financing decisions at large, and short-term debt issues in particular, may be perceived by market participants as signaling firm asset quality as suggested in, e.g., Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) . In this framework, there may be a potential advantage for short-term debt [Myers (1977) ]. In 1993 Diamond developed a model in which a firm's manager can choose debt seniority, as well as maturity. It shows that (i) short-term debt is optimal when it is senior; (ii) long-term debt is optimal when it is junior; and (iii) long-term debt is optimal when it allows the issuance of additional senior short-term debt at the interim date.
The third group relates to the role of securities in the allocation of ownership and control rights.
26
If both parties in a financing arrangement could write a contract without costs, contingent upon all possible states of the world, and lawfully enforceable, then the allocation of power in such a contractual 12 relationship would be irrelevant. Additionally, there would be little room for the exercise of ownership and control rights. In this case, all relevant decisions would be made ex-ante. Aghion and Bolton (1992) examine a project's long-term financing in an incomplete contracting framework [along the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) ]. An important result of their analysis concerns the implications of the standard debt contract in terms of the optimal (contingent) allocation of control rights.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Zender (1991) show that contracts with contingent transfer of control rights may minimize inefficiencies, which provides a rationale for standard debt contracts.
In the fourth group of models, securities are designed to optimize the information that investors have -acquisition of information. 27 It is widely accepted that the volume of information held by investors affects the value of a security. Thus, securities can be designed to affect the extent to which information is acquired in order to maximize value. In this line of reasoning, Boot and Thakor (1993) developed a model where a firm issues securities to investors who have to pay to become informed on the firms' value.
Similarly, Diamond (1993), Winton (1995) , and Glaeser and Kallal (1997) argue that the design and issuance of different classes of securities with different degrees of seniority -structuring -reduces monitoring costs. Boot and Thakor (1993) and Riddiough (1997) show that a financial institution wishing to raise funds in the presence of asymmetric information can increase revenue by pooling assets and issuing different types of securities against the pool of cash flow. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) developed a model akin to Boot and Thakor (1993) and argue that, considering the design of asset-backed securities, the optimal tranche is the senior one and the issuer retains the first loss tranche and any unsold fraction of the senior tranche. DeMarzo (2005) extends DeMarzo and Duffie's (1999) model and concludes that pooling and tranching allow intermediaries to leverage their capital more efficiently, enhancing the returns to their private information. An extension of the Boot and Thakor (1993) model is formulated by DeMarzo and Duffie (1997) in which they analyze the effect of information acquisition on the design of securities like collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). They show that marginal cash flows should be allocated to one security or another rather than split between securities. In Rajan and Winton (1995) , attention turns to covenants and collateral as common features of loans made by financial institutions.
They investigate how loans can be structured to enhance the institutions' incentives to monitor.
The fifth category includes models representing the allocation of risk among the different kinds of investors. 28 Several authors have studied this issue based on transaction costs as a source of market incompleteness. Allen and Gale (1988) developed a perfectly competitive, symmetric information model, where there are transaction costs and concluded that the price of a security is determined by the group that values it most. Pesendorfer (1995) formulated a model related to Ross (1989) and introduced financial 27 See, e.g., Boot and Thakor (1993) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1997) . 28 See, e.g., Allen and Gale (1988 , 1991 , and Pesendorfer (1995) .
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innovation. He showed that (i) innovation can improve agents' utilities by reducing costs of marketing;
(ii) the level of innovation is not necessarily constrained efficiently; and (iii) innovation eliminates indeterminacy observed in other models. An approach to security design is developed by Allen and Gale (1991) , who assume an environment in which the set of traded securities is endogenous and investors are permitted to undertake unlimited short sales. In this environment, and contrary to Allen and Gale (1988) where short selling is severely limited, equilibrium emerges. Allen and Gale (1988 Gale ( , 1991 Gale ( , and 1994 argue that, in AS, these restrictions can provide arbitrage value because two portfolios of securities paying the same amount may have different prices. Considering the optimal security design problem, Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) argue that in securitization the originator may prefer to issue a security with 'high information sensitivity' if he intends to maintain a residual equity position in the pool of assets.
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Using optimal risk allocation models, Benveniste and Berger (1987) and James (1988) show that securitization can improve risk sharing and increase project funding by avoiding the Myers (1977) underinvestment problem.
The literature to date does not provide much insight into the actual path of most financial innovations and SF products. Although all models yield a number of important insightful predictions, firms' financial and financing structures decisions still remain unsatisfactorily explained, mainly (i) in terms of SF transactions, and (ii) with respect to the reason why firms decide to use SF instead of common debt. One possible explanation is that existing security design theories do not simultaneously and dynamically endogenize all contractual features.
Data Description
DealScan and DCM Analytics databases
Our sample consists of individual loans and bond offers extracted from DealScan and DCM Analytics databases, respectively. DCM Analytics database is compiled by Dealogic and offers comprehensive information of debt securities issued on the debt capital markets. DealScan database is provided by Thomson Reuters LPC, a market information provider of individual deal information on the global syndicated loan markets. We use these two databases because we require information about the pricing characteristics of SF and SDF transactions. While DCM Analytics provides information regarding CB -used as a proxy for SDF transactions -and AS, DealScan provides information concerning PF loans -we use AS and PF transactions as proxies for SF instruments.
We study the factors that affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF transactions using a large cross section of Western European loans and bonds issued between January 1 st , 29 In such cases, the originator signals their incentives to monitor by maintaining an equity position. . We refer to this as our 'full sample'.
As the unit of observation is a single issue or a single loan tranche, multiple issues from the same transaction appear as separate observations in our database. PF and AS transactions typically consist of several tranches funding the same SPV. Therefore, we focus on the transaction tranches as our basic observation.
Since we which to perform maximum likelihood estimations of our credit spread samples for our model specification, simultaneously with a probit selection equation where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either micro and macro variables, we select from our full sample those issues that have complete data on credit spread. This screen has yielded a "high-information" sub-sample of 
Characteristics of Structured Finance versus Straight Debt Finance
This section provides a statistical analysis of SF (PF and AS) versus SDF (CB) lending in Western Europe. We start by comparing the distribution of loans and bonds across time, industry, and nationality of the borrower/issuer. The financial characteristics of PF loans are compared with the sample of AS bonds, as well as with our CB sample. The distribution by year of PF, AS, and CB issues is described in Table 1 . Table 2 presents the industrial distribution of the PF, AS, and CB issues, while Table 3 presents the geographic distribution of the facilities in each of these three samples.
**** Insert Tables 1, 2 , and 3 about here **** Table 4 about here **** According to the average maturity (years) variable, the three types of loans are substantially different financing instruments. The average maturity of PF loans, 13.6 years, is significantly lower that of the AS bonds full sample (20.9 years), but considerably longer than that of the CB full sample (5.3 years). Additionally, compared to AS and CB samples, PF loans involve more than the number of twice 17 banks in the transaction. Further, AS and CB transactions are more likely to be exposed to currency risk when compared to the PF full sample.
The most remarkable similarity between SF instruments is how frequently PF loans and AS bonds are issued with guarantees (96.9% and 100%, respectively). This largely meets the standard characteristics of PF and AS. Contrary to the traditional CB, where it is the ability of the issuer to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the debt obligation that determines the risks of the transaction, in AS the source of repayments shift from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows generated by the securitized assets and/or a third party guarantor, in case of default. In a PF transaction, the financing is structured with as little recourse as possible to the sponsor, while at the same time providing sufficient credit support through guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor or third party, so that lenders will be satisfied with the credit risk.
Finally, AS and CB issues are frequently extended to financial institutions, with 74.1% of AS tranches and 80.8% of CB tranches issued by borrowers in this industry. As expected, only 0.43% of all PF loans are issued by sponsors in the financial institutions industry.
The Financing Choice
When comparing the values of credit spread in AS bonds, PF loans, and CB issues highinformation samples -loans and bonds that have complete data on credit spread -we conclude that PF loans are a more expensive type of financing than CB and even than AS bonds. On the contrary, average credit spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly. 34 Our findings diverge from those presented by Hu and Cantor (2006) , Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) , and Maris and Segal (2002) . Hu and Cantor (2006) and Maris and Segal (2002) state that AS securities credit spreads have been higher than CB credit spreads. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) point out that floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads than do most comparable non-PF loans. We also conclude that PF issues have lower credit rating and a higher number of banks involved. Our full samples also reveal that SF loans and bonds have lower loan to value ratios than SDF issues and have longer time to maturity.
These observations are ex post in nature. They do, however, lead to a question concerning the choice between SF and SDF transactions and even between PF loans and AS bonds: What factors determine the managerial choice between these financing alternatives? In order to answer this question, the effects of each of the two financing approaches on the overall cost of financing have to be clear. For example, the decision either to go with a PF transaction or with a CB, should be based on the trade-off between the composite cost of capital of the PF and the sponsor's, and the sponsor's overall cost of capital after the CB.
We thus want to determine what affects the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF transactions. Additionally, and given the fact that the credit spread between AS bonds and PF loans is statistically and significantly different at the 5% level or higher we have also studied the probability of a new sponsor choosing to structure a new loan as a PF or AS. Similarly, and given the fact that AS bonds and CB have similar characteristics as they are both issued in capital markets, we also studied the main factors affecting the probability of a new borrower's choice between AS and CB issues.
Moreover, as described in section 3, our sample includes SF loans and bonds, as well as SDF out that a flight to quality might have left many borrowers in these countries credit-rationed. As a result, the probability of observing SF deals with relevant pricing information (i.e., our sample selection) might not be random but rather somewhat determined by the same risk characteristics that enter our pricing regressions. Therefore, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979) . We perform a maximum likelihood estimation on our credit spread samples of our model specification, simultaneously with a probit selection equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either micro and macro variables.
Determinants of the Financing Choice
As stated in the introduction, choosing between SF and SDF includes a decision related to the firm's cost of capital, because an increase in leverage increases the required cost of capital. This is the case as SF typically refers to the transfer of a subset of a company's assets (an 'activity') into a bankruptcy-remote corporation or other special purpose vehicle or entity (SPV/SPE); i.e., the assets instrumental to managing the project are separated from the remaining assets of the parties that create the vehicle. Therefore, the factors affecting the differences in credit spread for SF and SDF transactions also affect the financing choice.
The academic literature contains numerous loan pricing studies, both theoretical and empirical.
Next we review the most prominent ones. Concerning PF loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that PF loan spreads are directly related to variables such as country risk, the use of covenants in the loan contract, and project leverage. In their paper, they conclude that a third-party guarantee significantly reduces PF loan spreads, while PF loan pricing is not a positive function of maturity and loan size. However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term structure of credit spreads for noninvestment grade bonds [e.g., Fons (1987) , Sarig and Warga (1989) , and Helwege and Turner (1999) ].
Referring to AS bond credit spreads, Rothberg et al. (1989) argue that liquidity and credit risk significantly affect the pricing of pass-through securities. Maris and Segal (2002) study the determinants of credit spread on CMBS and find that (i) default probability, (ii) tranche size, (iii) transaction size, and (iv) year influence CMBS credit spreads. Ammer and Clinton (2004) find that rating downgrades are accompanied by negative returns and widening spreads. Firla-Cuchra (2005) argues that credit rating is the most important pricing factor for this asset class at issue. This idea is corroborated by Gorton and Souleles (2005) , Hu and Cantor (2006) , and Vink and Thibeault (2008). Pinto et al. (2013) analyze loan and bond pricing factors and conclude that several pricing factors apply for both SF and SDF transactions. The relevant factors found in the loan pricing analysis are: (i) the tranche size, the loan to value ratio, the number of banks, and currency risk-microeconomic variables;
and (ii) financial crisis and the slope of the Euro area yield curve -macroeconomic variables.
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All the aforementioned pricing factors should also be important in the financing choice.
Therefore, in influencing the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, we consider the fourteen variables presented in Table 5 , which gives an overview of the variables and their expected impact on the sponsor financing choice. With respect to the influence of the individual determinants, the sample characteristics presented in Table 4 convey the impression that, when compared to CB, SF tranches are on average larger for AS bonds and smaller for PF loans. On average, we expect that SF tranches are smaller than SDF tranches since tranching (issuance of multiple debt security classes) and the consequent risk dispersion is often cited as one of the major SF benefits. Also, loans exposed to currency risk are more likely to be prepared as SDF transactions. Conversely, loans with longer maturity and issued with a thirdparty guarantee are more likely to be structured as SF. Comparing PF loans with AS bonds, we expect that if a sponsor would like to obtain funding for a longer period of time, he will choose to issue securities backed by receivables, rather than structuring a PF transaction. Table 5 about here **** With respect to the sector or business group, PF is most commonly used for capital-intensive ventures -such as power plants, refineries, toll roads, pipelines, telecommunications facilities, and industrial plants -with relatively transparent cash flows. Thus, we expect that borrowers belonging to industrial, utilities, and transportation industries are more likely to use PF loans. Moreover, and given the importance of the PPPs in Western Europe -PPPs reduce the need for government borrowing, shift part of the risks presented by the project to the private sector, and aim at achieving more effective management of the project -, we also expect that government and public sector entities rely on PF as an important form of allowing a project to proceed without being a direct burden on the government's budget. AS is the process whereby financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and converted into negotiable securities to be placed into the market. The major issuers of AS bonds are companies belonging to commercial and financial industries, with particular emphasis on bankssecuritization technique allows the transformation of heterogeneous assets that are mostly not negotiable by banks into liquid and homogenous securities, suitable for trade. With respect to CB, issues are also highly concentrated in the financial industry (67.2% of the total value and 80.8% of the total number) -see Table 2 . Thus, we expect that financial institutions are more likely to use AS and CB issues.
**** Insert
There is broad consensus that SF, more specifically AS, played an important role in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Thus, transactions developed during the crisis period are more likely to be arranged as SDF transactions. However, transactions were more likely to be structured as PF, rather than AS during that period.
The general level of interest rates (risk free rate), the slope of the Euro swap curve (a proxy of the expectations about the future evolution of interest rates), and the market volatility seem to support the use 21 of SF. Finally, an improvement in credit conditions, and therefore of credit accessibility by borrowers, will increase the usage of either SF or SDF. Thus, we cannot clearly determine the impact of credit accessibility on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF.
In order to test these expected impacts, a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979) , has been designed. This methodology and the underlying sample for the empirical analysis are presented in the following section. Although the fourteen micro and macro independent variables are selfexplanatory, the dependent variable requires definition. The credit spread corresponds to the price for the risk associated with the financing instrument, on the basis of available information, at the time of issue.
For PF loans, the credit spread represents the spread paid by the borrower over 3-month Euribor or 3-month Libor. For bonds, the spread is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. None of these measures are perfect proxies for the credit risk associated with loans and bonds. In particular, the spread over Euribor or Libor does not represent the full economic cost of credit. Loans and bonds also carry fees that can be related to creditworthiness and performance. The comparability of our pricing variables across loans and bonds is improved by making the following adjustment. While in PF loans the benchmark priced off
Euribor or Libor is a three-month interbank rate, bonds typically carry a spread over a benchmark government security (e.g., German Treasury Bonds). Therefore, there is a difference between the two benchmarks represented by different credit risk levels involving unsecured short-term bank risk and a risk-free government rate. Following the approach of Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) , we adjust for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks by adding to the Euribor or Libor spread of the PF loans the difference between the three-month Euro Libor and the three-month German Treasury bill at the time when the loans were granted. 
Methodology
In order to test the expected impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979) . We perform maximum likelihood estimations on our credit spread samples of our model specification simultaneously with a probit selection equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either micro and macro variables.
We have observed credit spread when a loan is an SF loan or bond versus an SDF bond (or a PF loan versus an AS bond or an AS bond versus a CB). Then we fit a binomial probit model that predicts the loan's probability of being arranged as an SF transaction. In this circumstance, s i -the selection 35 The average difference is 31 basis points and has a standard deviation of 44 basis points during our sample period. Additionally, as loans are priced over a three month rate while bonds tend to be priced off longer-term benchmarks, we include as additional control in our regression analysis the slope of the Euro swap curve as the difference between the 5 year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor at the time of the signing of the loan or issuing the bonds.
indicator -is set to zero or one on the factors underlying that decision. Thus, the selection indicator which is analyzed here is of a binary format: 1 for SF (or PF or AS), 0 for SDF (or AS or CB), whether the issue is presented in the analysis or not. The Heckman selection model assumes that there exists an underlying regression relationship,
The dependent variable, however, is not always observed. Rather, the dependent variable for observation i is observed if (2) where:
Equation 1 The Heckman (1979) selection model is driven by the notion that some of the Z factors for a loan are different from the factors in X. For example, whether a sponsor belongs or not to the financial institution industry is likely to influence whether a borrower chooses an SF transaction but might be omitted from credit spread determination equation: it appears in Z but not in X. Other factors are likely to appear in both equations. For example, the tranche size and whether the loan is arranged during the crisis period will likely influence the borrower decision to choose an SF transaction as well as the credit spread that will be paid in that transaction.
Thus, we fit the model (3) 36 For further analysis of Heckman selection models see, among others, Heckman (1979) 
and we assume that credit spread is observed if (4) We use a full maximum-likelihood procedure to jointly estimate β, γ, and ρ. The model is fitted over the entire sample and gives an estimate of the crucial correlation ρ -the correlation of u and v -, along with a test or the hypothesis that ρ = 0. The rejection of this hypothesis means that an OLS estimation of equation 1 will produce inconsistent estimates of β. When running our model we adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980) . We can thus obtain robust standard errors for our credit spread model. 
Results
Results are reported in Table 6 
differently for PF loans than for AS bonds. Whereas spread and loan to value are significantly, positively related for PF loans, they have a significant negative relationship for AS bonds. These results are in line with the expected coefficient sign for PF and AS issues. AS bonds demonstrate a larger coefficient compared to PF loans, which means that lenders associate an increase in the loan to value ratio with a significant reduction of credit risk for these types of securities. Similarly, the variable number of banks behaves differently for PF loans as compared with AS bonds. Whereas credit spread and number of banks are significantly and positively related for PF loans, they have a significantly negative relationship for AS issues. The need for a higher number of banks in arranging a PF transaction can possibly be associated with an increase in risk and thus an extra premium is demanded. For AS issues, a larger number of banks involved is able to lower the spread once investors associate a larger number of banks with an increase in the certification of the transaction. Finally, a transaction with the issue date or active date belonging to the crisis period will have a higher average credit spread of 178.77 bps, and 113.87 bps for PF, and AS issues, respectively.
Next, we will analyze the signs and magnitude of the coefficients obtained for the explanatory factors Z in our selection equations. With respect to model [1], borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk. Similarly, borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase the likelihood of an SF transaction. On the contrary, the probability of observing an SF transaction decreases with the tranche size and currency risk. Several macroeconomic factors significantly determine the selection of an SF transaction. Among these, risk free rate, volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M), and credit accessibility influence positively the probability of observing an SF loan or bond over an SDF bond. As expected, the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of observing an SF loan or bond. Somewhat counter intuitively, the financial institutions' dummy variable is found to decrease the likelihood of a borrower/issuer choosing an SF transaction. However, this can be explained by the fact that from the total number of uncensored observations the major part belongs to PF loans, where financial institutions are the lenders and not the borrowers/issuers. Our findings are in line with the expected impact of micro and macro factors in the financing decision between SF and SDF -see Table 5 .
Considering the choice between PF and AS, the following (macro) factors do not influence the decision: volatility, credit accessibility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M). For these factors, the expected sign of coefficients was not possible to determine clearly. As expected, for all sector dummy variables, with the exception of the financial institutions, the coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of the financial institutions dummy variable is negative and significant, which means that sponsors belonging to the financial institution industry are less likely to use PF loans; i.e., are more likely to use securitization as a funding instrument. The country risk rating is 25 positive and significant at the 5% level. This leads to the conclusion that a sponsor located in a risky country is more likely to be financed with a PF loan than an AS bond. The same sign can be found for the other analyzed macro variables; i.e., crisis and risk free rate. We can thus conclude that the financial crisis (as expected) led to a transfer in the form of funding based on SF transactions, increasing the use of PF and reducing the use of AS. The negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk dummy variable indicates that in the case of currency risk AS is preferred. Finally, sponsors prefer AS bonds for larger tranches and funding with a higher time to maturity. Again, these findings are in line with the expected impact on the choice of PF over AS.
The regression results for model [3] reveal that the tranche size and industrial, utilities, financial institutions, and transportation dummy variables do not have an influence on the financing choice between AS and CB. AS is chosen when issuers seek longer-term sources of funding, are established in riskier countries and bonds face currency risk. As expected, risk free rate, volatility, and EUSA5y-Libor3M positively influence the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB. Again, and due to the relevant role played by securitization in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the crisis dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. Finally, the unique sector with a significant impact on the probability of observing an AS instead of a CB issue is government; i.e., issuers in government industry decrease the likelihood of observing an AS transaction.
In models [1] and [3] the likelihood-ratio test for ρ = 0 -Wald test (rho=0) -lead us to accept the hypothesis of equations (3) and (4) above being independent. On the contrary, we reject this hypothesis for model [2] , pointing out the presence of selection bias. However, we have re-estimated the models controlling for this selection bias and they don't yield results fundamentally different; i.e., the sign and significance of variables remain the same. Table 5 summarizes our findings, providing an overview of the variables, their expected impact on the financing choice, and our findings. We find, for example, that: (i) the effect of lower tranche size increases the probability of selecting an SF transaction, rather than an SDF transaction -the same takes place in the selection process between AS bonds and PF loans; (ii) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they are looking for long-term financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk; (iii) borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase the likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically a PF transaction, while the probability of observing an AS bond issue increases if the borrower belongs to the financial industry -the coefficient of financial institutions for model [3] is statistically insignificant because financial institutions use either AS bonds and CB to get funding in capital markets; (iv) as expected, the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of observing an SF transaction, despite the crisis increased the probability of observing a PF loan vis-a-vis an AS bond; (v) the level of the interest rates, market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and 26 credit accessibility positively influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond; (vi) market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility proves to be irrelevant in the process of the financing decision between PF and AS.
Robustness Checks
As pointed out, several authors argue that credit rating is the most important pricing factor for AS bonds at issue [e.g., Rothberg et al. (1989) , Maris and Segal (2002) , Firla-Cuchra (2005) , Gorton and Souleles (2005) , Hu and Cantor (2006) , Vink and Thibeault (2008) , and Pinto et al. (2013) ]. Therefore, in order to ensure that our estimates are unbiased, we re-estimated model [3] by augmenting the initial specifications of the determination equation with rating variable. 37 We start our analysis by looking at the estimation of the determination equation in model [4] , in which we regress credit spread against micro and macro variables for a sample that includes 364 AS bonds. 38 We have not re-estimated models [1] and
[2] because it is difficult to obtain credit risk information for PF loans -there are only 39 PF loans with available information on credit rating. This is because the information about the credit rating for PF loans at closing date provided by DealScan is scant when compared with the credit rating information provided by DCM Analytics database for AS and CB issues. Table 7 shows exactly the results expected; i.e., the higher the credit risk of the issuer the higher the credit spread. Comparing the results obtained in estimating the determination equation for models [3] and [4], we conclude that the coefficients on log loan to value and on number of banks and U.K.
borrowers dummy variables become insignificant, while crisis dummy variable remains significantly and positively related to credit spread. Our findings are in line with both theoretical and empirical studies, which present the excessive reliance on asset securitization credit ratings as one of the causes of the financial crisis [e.g., Tavakoli (2008 , Gennaioli et al. (2010), and Mishkin (2010) ]. The increasing complexity of the securitization market and the ever growing range of products being made available to investors created challenges in terms of efficient information assembly and an excessive reliance of investors on credit ratings. **** Insert Table 7 about here ****
The regression results for model [4] reveal that the signs and magnitude of the coefficients obtained for the explanatory factors Z in our selection equation are largely consistent with the original version. Only one difference in significance of the coefficients can be pointed out: regression results for 37 Our classification scheme consists of 22 rating scales for two rating agencies: Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Moody's. Bond ratings are based on the S&P and Moody's bond rating at issue. If both ratings are available, the average rating is calculated and used. This classification scheme follows the approach proposed by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) and Gatti, et al. (2013 
Summary and Conclusions
The paper provides interesting empirical findings for both academics and practitioners. For academics, the paper provides evidence consistent with the notion that structured finance (SF) does matter, because it affects investment incentives, deadweight financing costs, and asset cash flows.
Furthermore, the paper also provides results from the empirical testing of a number of predictions based on mainstream security design models. For practitioners, the paper provides framework for understanding why SF creates value and when to choose it instead of straight debt financing because, as we argue, SF reduces financing all-in cost. In particular, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms use SF to reduce costly agency conflicts resulting from creating asset-specific governance solutions to mitigate free cash flow problems and prevent opportunistic behavior. Moreover, any transaction which is specifically structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing assets producing cash flows solely for supporting the transaction, allows the issuer to obtain better credit ratings and/or leverage than it would be possible by issuing senior secured debt, because it reduces asymmetric information problems.
We applied an organizational choice model to SF and straight debt finance (SDF) transactions to determine the factors that affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF transactions, and even between project finance (PF) loans and asset securitization (AS) bonds or between AS bonds and corporate bonds (CB).
We found that: (i) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they are looking for long-term financing and when they operate in a higher risk country; (ii) borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government showed higher likelihood to choose SF transactions; (iii) the probability of observing an SF transaction decreased with the tranche size and currency risk; (iv) several macroeconomic factors significantly determined the selection of an SF transaction -among these, the level of interest rates, the market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and the credit accessibility positively influenced the probability of observing an SF loan or bond over an SDF bond; and (v) the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as expected, decreased the probability of observing an SF loan or bond.
Considering the choice between PF and AS: (i) the coefficients of the industrial, utilities, transportation, and government dummy variables were positive; i.e., sponsors belonging to the financial 29 industry were more likely to use securitization as a funding source; (ii) a sponsor located in a country with a lower sovereign rating proved more likely to be financed with a PF loan than an AS bond; (iii) the financial crisis, as expected, led to a transfer in the form of funding based on SF transactions, increasing the use of PF and reducing the use of AS; (iv) the negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk dummy variable indicated that in the case of currency risk, AS is preferred; and (v) sponsors preferred AS bonds for larger tranches and when they sought funding with a higher time to maturity.
Finally, with respect to the choice between AS and CB, we concluded that: (i) AS was chosen when issuers are looking for longer-term sources of funding, are established in riskier countries and bonds face currency risk; (ii) the level of interest rates, the market volatility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve, as expected, influenced positively the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB; (iii) the unique sector that had a significant impact on the probability of observing an AS instead of a CB issue, was government; and (iv) again, and due to the relevant role played by securitization in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the crisis dummy variable was significantly negative.
Our results are in line with security design literature. SF transactions or instruments, based on extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with market imperfections, namely agency problems and asymmetric information. Accordingly to Diamond (1993), Hart and Moore (1995) , Winton (1995) , Glaeser and Kallal (1997) , and Riddiough (1997) , in AS the design and issuance of different classes of securities with different degrees of seniority -structuringreduces monitoring costs. Our results corroborate these findings, as credit spread and loan to value have a significant negative relationship for AS bonds. Similarly, structural features of PF transactions, like extensive contracting, concentrated debt and equity ownership, separate legal incorporation, and high leverage, reduce costly agency conflicts at the project level.
We also corroborate Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) results, as borrowers chose an SF visa-vis an SDF transaction when they seek long-term financing. Thus, when the information about the true quality of a firm's assets is asymmetrically distributed between insiders and outsiders, short-term debt issues may be perceived by market participants as signaling firm asset quality and borrowers prefer SDF transactions. Referring to PF, we conclude that PF is most commonly used for capital-intensive facilities and utilities with relatively transparent cash flows, in riskier than average countries, using relatively longterm financing. Thus, our results corroborate the conclusions of Shah and Thakor (1987) , Kensinger and Martin (1988 ), and Esty (2004a , 2004b . Riskier projects should be project-financed because PF can help to reduce underinvestment by mitigating asymmetric information problems. The following characters in Table 5 mean: -= negative impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | + = positive impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | I = insignificant impact | ? = sign cannot be determined clearly | NA = information about this variables is not available. Table 6 : Regression analyses of the probability of observing an SF loan or bond
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. **, * indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Credit spread (bps) Table 7 : Regression analysis of the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB: the impact of credit risk
Credit spread (bps) The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. **, * indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Credit spread (bps) 
